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Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub:
Infrastructures of Solidarity and the
1957 Cairo Conference*
REEM ABOU-EL-FADL
SOAS University of London
INDECEMBER 1957, Cairo University played host to a conference with adifference – an international gathering of unprecedented scale in the
colonised world. Representatives from forty-six countries across Asia
and Africa spent a week in discussions, sharing their experiences
of colonisation and their aspirations to overcome it. Their closing
resolution invoked the Asian-African Conference held two years
earlier in Bandung, Indonesia, which they said had ‘set the standard’
with its principles of self-determination, global equality, and peace.1
Bandung remains preeminent in the lore of Afro-Asianism worldwide,
and in historiographies of decolonisation today. Yet the Afro-Asian
People’s Solidarity Conference and its Cairo Declaration were self-
consciously a broadening and deepening of the ‘Bandung Spirit’ and
example: Cairo’s delegates represented many more countries, most of
them yet to achieve independence, and they were not political elites,
but activists, unionists, writers, and artists.
This presents two paradoxes for exploration, reflecting the richness
of the extraordinary historical process of decolonisation. Firstly, the
Cairo Conference delegates celebrated their struggles for national
liberation – many were nationalist activists and organisers – but they
also greeted each other as Afro-Asians. How did the national and
transnational coexist in this context? Secondly, not only were the*For their generous feedback on this article, I am grateful to the Afro-Asian Networks
collective, particularly Rachel Leow, Su Lin Lewis and Carolien Stolte, and to Felix
Berenskoetter, Omnia El Shakry, Salwa Ismail and Yara Salahiddeen. I also thank the two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 ‘Address by Yusuf Al-Siba‘i’, The First Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference (Cairo:
AAPSO, 1958), 21.
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taken great risk in travelling to Cairo, evading colonial border controls
or the surveillance of hostile regimes. Yet it was the Egyptian state that
was sponsoring these proceedings, with a senior cabinet minister
appointed conference chair. How can we understand popular agency
and its limits in a state-sponsored peoples’ conference? This article
responds by analysing the building of an ‘infrastructure of solidarity’ on
multiple spatial scales in the Egyptian capital in the 1950s, and the
ways in which state and popular actors interacted at such sites. It
situates the Cairo Conference in this process, starting with the
founding of the African Association in 1955, followed by the Afro-
Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in 1958. The former
was established as a home from home for African students and political
activists, while the latter was to continue the work of the Cairo
Conference. Both owed some of their resources to the state but were
officially independent of it.
The question of Afro-Asian identity has hardly had a hearing in
Middle East Studies, where there has been a lack of engagement with
Egypt’s Afro-Asian policy under Gamal Abdel Nasser.2 Instead scholars
have focused on the Arab scale – given Nasser’s captivation of Arab
audiences, and the devastating Arab defeat of 19673 – variously
engaging the conventional wisdom that Arab nationalism ‘failed’. This
notion assumes that pan-Arab and national loyalties were mutually
exclusive,4 and that there was an imperialist purpose behind Egypt’s
pan-Arabism.5 By contrast, Egypt features prominently in global
history scholarship on decolonisation, particularly that focused on the
Bandung Conference,6 in which overlapping national and transna-2 One important work is Tareq Ismael, The UAR in Africa: Egypt’s Policy Under Nasser
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).
3 See James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Joseph Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign
Policy and the Search for National Identity (Oxford: Westview, 1990); John Waterbury, The
Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983).
4 Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad
Pact (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 13; Avraham Sela, ‘Nasser’s Regional Politics: A Reassessment’,
in Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Egypt, ed. Podeh and Onn
Winckler (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 2004), 183.
5 Podeh, 13.
6 Christopher Lee, ed., Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its
Political Afterlives (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010); Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955:
Nonalignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005); Derek
McDougall and Antonia Finnane, eds., Bandung 1955: Little Histories (Caulfield: Monash
Asia Institute, 2010). This discrepancy is likely a legacy of the early twentieth century
foundations of different fields, and the separation of Middle East from African Studies. See
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 159tional engagements are uncontroversial. Yet even here, the Bandung
andCairo Conferences are at times deemed part of a fleeting moment of
‘high-minded symbolism’,7 which masked participants’ rivalries and
nationally differentiated priorities.8 There is room for a different
perspective, which acknowledges the transnational circulations of ideas
and solidarity practices in the spaces created by both conferences.
The role of non-state actors has not been a significant focus in
studies of Nasser’s Egypt, and even the state’s agency has often been
downplayed. Many accounts have employed a ‘Cold War lens’,9
privileging the feuding superpowers’ perspective. Scholars have been
preoccupied with evidencing that the Nasserist project overreached,
and that its counterbalancing of great powers was a fruitless strategy.10
Here they have presented Cairo as very much beholden to Moscow,
and AAPSO as a Soviet front through the activities of the World
Peace Council, with competition from the Chinese.11 This approach
overlooks the active hostility that confronted such Third World
projects,12 as well as the multifaceted agency of a state like Egypt, given
the role of the popular networks analysed here. By contrast, scholarship
on Algeria has celebrated it as a haven for Third World liberation
movements.13 This only makes the silence on Egypt’s role more
problematic, given that Egypt hosted the Algerian National Liberation
Front’s provisional government nine years before Algerian indepen-
dence, amongst several other internationalist commitments.Zachary Lockman, Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
7 Frank Gerits, ‘Bandung as the Call for a Better Development Project: US, British,
French andGold Coast Perceptions of the Afro-Asian Conference’,ColdWar History 16, no.
3 (2016).
8 See James Brennan, ‘Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953–1964’,
in Lee, 173; Robert Vitalis, ‘The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of
Bandung (Ban-doong)’, Humanity 4, no. 2 (2013): 261–288.
9 Matthew Connelly, ‘Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict
during the Algerian War for Independence’, The American Historical Review 105, no. 3
(2000): 739–769.
10 See Adeed Dawisha, ‘Egypt’, inThe ColdWar and theMiddle East, ed. Yezid Sayigh and
Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 47.
11 Charles Neuhauser, China and the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization,
1957–1967 (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Research Center, 1968). On the WPC see
Stolte in this issue.
12 Katharine McGregor and Vanessa Hearman, ‘Challenging the Lifeline of
Imperialism’, in Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending
Futures, ed. Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), 164.
13 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Byrne,Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and Third
World Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
160 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019This article builds on the small but growing literature that addresses
actors beneath the high politics level of Afro-Asianism, involved in
national and transnational communities simultaneously.14 It focuses on
the subaltern agency of Egyptian activists, writers, and artists, who made
ofCairo ahub forArab,African, andAfro-Asianconnectionsof different
kinds in the 1950s. To do so, I engage with scholarship from historical
geography on the relational production of place, and the generative
nature of solidarity. In her work on London as a world city, Doreen
Massey proposes ‘an alternative geographical imagination in which the
character of a region . . . is a productnot onlyof internal interactions but
also of relations with elsewhere’.15 Cairo as a place for Afro-Asian
solidarity canbe similarly understood as a product of interactions athome
and elsewhere. Egyptian solidarity activists confronted an unequal,
colonially constituted external geography, and sought to remake it into
oneofglobal justiceandpeace.Aspatial analysishelps clarify thedriverof
their solidarity practice, namely the recognition of their entanglement
with other colonised peoples, and theway imperial power operates ‘along
long chains of command’,16 which they aim to disrupt.17 As Massey
argues, ‘[l]ocality and interconnectedness are often part of the very poli-
tics, even the focus, of the struggle . . . their rethinking may be a crucial
part of political organising’.18 To examine this process, I draw on the
concept of translocality, which connotes ‘situatedness during mobility’:
‘agents’ “simultaneous situatedness across different locales”’.19 Its twin
valences appear in the forging of physical places for connections to be
made, and the flow of people and ideas between them. Such solidarity
practice is generative of new political imaginaries and communities in
turn, as David Featherstone elaborates: ‘translocal political organizing’20
can lead to ‘the active creation of new ways of relating’.2114 Duncan Yoon, “‘Our Forces Have Redoubled”: World Literature, Postcolonialism,
and the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau’, Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry 2, no.
2 (2015); Laura Bier, ‘Feminism, Solidarity, and Identity in the Age of Bandung’, in Lee;
Vijay Prashad, ‘Cairo’, in The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (London:
New Press, 2007); McGregor and Hearman.
15 Doreen Massey, World City (Cambridge: Polity Press 2007), 17.
16 Massey (2008), 323.
17 Massey, ‘Geographies of Solidarity’, inMaterial Geographies: AWorld in the Making, ed.
Nigel Clarke, Massey and Philip Sarre (London: Open University, 2008), 323.
18 Ibid., 313.
19 See discussion in Clemens Greiner and Patrick Sakdapolrak, ‘Translocality:
Concepts, Applications and Emerging Research Perspectives’,Geography Compass 7 (2013):
375–376.
20 David Featherstone, Solidarity: Hidden Histories and Geographies of Internationalism
(London: Zed Books, 2012), 18.
21 Featherstone, 5.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 161Accordingly, I argue firstly that Egyptians negotiating the challen-
ges of decolonisation in the 1950s built an infrastructure for translocal
solidarity on Arab, African, and Afro-Asian scales simultaneously, and
engaged in the relational construction of identity in the process.
Moving between localities at each scale, they tried to renegotiate and
break down some of the borders between them, most notably by seeking
to move Algeria and Palestine from Arab onto Afro-Asian agendas.
Secondly, I argue that Cairo as an Afro-Asian hub was produced
through tensions and collaborations between state and non-state
actors, in the context of a state that monopolised the political sphere,
but promoted a political project of anti-imperialism that enjoyed
widespread legitimacy.
The first section of this article examines the local places in which
international solidarity was practised in 1950s Cairo, focusing on the
African Association in the period before the Cairo Conference. The
second section examines the interactions between delegates at
the Cairo Conference itself, as a site for the creation of new
identities through solidarity. I highlight the Egyptian delegation’s
promotion of the causes of Algeria and Palestine, revealing the ways
in which the three scales – Egyptian, Arab, Afro-Asian – of identifi-
cation merged in these Egyptians’ constructions of identity. In the
final section I chart the addition of AAPSO to Cairo’s infrastructure
of solidarity, and analyse the ways in which it enhanced the
possibilities for mobility and rootedness on a more expansive, Afro-
Asian, scale.
In this sense, this article responds to Christopher Lee’s invitation to
identify ‘the varied locations and complex, situated meanings of ‘Afro-
Asianism,’ and to similar calls from historians of black internationalism
to subject its networks and geographies of encounter to greater scrutiny,
rather than generalising about its meaning.22 In so doing I connect the
literature on nation making in Egypt with that on decolonisation and
Cold War politics, and re-establish the overlooked connections forged
across the African continent and into Asia by one of Africa’s first
independent states. I conclude with reflections on the contours and
limits of solidarity in decolonising states.22 Lee, ‘Between a Moment and an Era and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of
Bandung’, in Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political
Afterlives, ed. Christopher Lee (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 3–4;
Diarmaid Kelliher, ‘Historicising Geographies of Solidarity’, Geography Compass 12,
no. 9 (2018): 5.
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IN CAIRO
In June 1954, Egypt’s daily Al-Ahram reported that the annual
Liberation Festival would see Cairo host a ‘general congress of peoples
from colonised African territories’, in solidarity with them against
imperialism.23 In late 1955, this trend was enhanced with the formation
of the African Association: a crucial precursor and later complement to
AAPSO, it has been overlooked in the literature on Egypt’s foreign
policy andAfro-Asiannetworks. Its address at 5AhmadHeshmat Street
in Zamalek became the site of tens of African liberation movement
offices, and a cultural centre for Egyptian scholars, writers, students
and activists who supported their cause. As official policy was being
developed, Association members were hosting, introducing, broad-
casting, and even mobilising African activists in Cairo. These were
translocal interactions: producing interconnectedness between differ-
ent local places, across different spatial scales, simultaneously. They
created a permanent politicised space for the African community to
organise inCairo: a rootedness whichwas in itself a resource for activists
suffering political persecution and often forced underground. At the
same time this fixity promoted mobility: it allowed individuals to meet
one another and share their experiences and skills, and encouraged ideas
to flow between Cairo and other locales, even if their authors were
immobile. This was in turn a politically productive solidarity practice,
extending relations and resources across borders, overcoming colonial
‘enclosure’ and isolation. Indeed, the Association was also a place for
African liberation movements’ political expression, through channels
furnished and contributed to by their Egyptian hosts.
The Association was established just three years after the Free
Officers toppled the Egyptian monarch in July 1952. Led by Gamal
Abdel Nasser, this clandestine military movement seized power with
the stated aim of purging Egypt of all imperial influence. At that time,
the state tradition was firmly Egyptian nationalist, with little Arab or
Afro-Asian engagement.24 The Free Officers had promptly begun
outreach in both Arab and African spheres, with the strategy of forging23 ‘Forthcoming Cairo Conference of African People’, 478, 24, 22.6.54.
24 Egypt headed the Arab League, but its member states were mostly still colonised, its
decisions limited. In Africa, Egypt had strong ties only with Sudan, an Arab state that it had
previously governed until it came under British rule in the 1880s. See Eve Troutt Powell, A
Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003). Otherwise, Egypt had an embassy in Addis Ababa and
diplomatic missions in South Africa and Somalia: Fayiq, ‘Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra
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Britain.25 In 1955 Nasser travelled to Bandung – via Delhi and
Rangoon26 – where he affirmed Egypt’s solidarity with all colonised
nations, based on their common past experiences and future challenges
of development.27 This logic of connection and mutuality prompted a
strategy to disrupt the colonial chain, and informed the Egyptian
leadership’s invitation to liberation movement leaders to convene in
Cairo.28 Indeed historian Muhammad Anis described Bandung at the
time using metaphors of space and movement, as ‘the moment of Arab
nationalism’s exit from isolation’, prompting its fusion with Afro-
Asianism and ‘progressive humanism’.29 Many scholars have under-
stood such discourse as masking a contradiction,30 but for Egypt’s
leaders, the national and international were mutually reinforcing
routes to liberation, and assuring a decolonised neighbourhood was a
matter of survival. If Burma, India and China had already begun their
outreach along similar lines in previous years,31 Egypt was in this sense
a pioneer among African states.
The Association’s role as a base for African liberation movements
evolved gradually. It was first founded to take responsibility for the
thousands of students now coming to Egypt on university scholarships,
particularly from the Nile Basin countries and from Muslim commu-
nities inWest Africa.32 Behind this was a motivation to locate students
who were involved in national liberation movements in their home
countries, with whom Cairo could foster productive relations. Some of
these would become representatives with permanent offices at theAl-Ifriqiyya [Abdel Nasser and the African Revolution] (Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al-
‘Arabi, 1982), 8–9.
25 Nasser’s engagements in the Arab arena are well documented, although their very
early nature is less widely recognised. See Abou-El-Fadl, Foreign Policy as Nation Making:
Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 147–177.
26 See Su Lin Lewis, ‘Skies That Bind: Air Travel in the Bandung Era’, Afro-Asian
Visions blog, 2016: https://medium.com/afro-asian-visions/skies-that-bind-air-travel-in-the-
bandung-era-feac8e844993.
27 Nasser, Speech at Opening Ceremony of Bandung Conference, Nasser.org website,
19.4.55: http://www.nasser.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=339&lang=ar.
28 Al-Ahram, 13.1.54, 6, see Ismael, 24. Egypt had already begun hosting the
Algerian National Liberation Front in 1953: Fathi Al-Deeb, ‘Abd Al-Nasir wa Thawrat
Al-Jaza’ir [Abdel Nasser and the Algerian Revolution] (Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al-
‘Arabi, 1984).
29 Muhammad Anis,Al-Mu’tamar Al-Asyawi Al-Ifriqi [The Asian-African Conference],
Ikhtarna Lak 44 (Cairo, 1958), 160.
30 See fn 9.
31 See Leow, Lewis and Stolte in this issue.
32 See Fayiq, 44–45; ‘Nigerian Students for Egypt’, Summaries of World Broadcasts, BBC
Written Archives (hereafter SWB) IV 420, 39, 27.11.53.
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Muhammad Fayiq, who headed the presidency’s new African Affairs
Bureau from 1955 to 1966.33 The Association itself was not a state
organisation, however, and its director AbdAl-Aziz Ishak was a scholar,
formerly at Khartoum University and later consultant to the Foreign
Ministry.34 The Association’s community hovered close to, but outside,
the bureaucratic apparatus.
One such figure was Helmi Sharawy, who went on to become
coordinator of the African liberation movements in the Egyptian
presidency, but had begun by pursing research at the Association. He
had visited it in its first year, and was captivated by the anticolonial
fervour and ideological commitment of its community. Sharawy stresses
that its Egyptian staff were not state employees, and kept their distance
from the ‘personal projects’ and political climbing surrounding the mass
party of the time, the National Union.35 Sharawy describes himself as
having been caught between the lofty ambitions of contributing to the
cause of national liberation in Africa, and the mundane concern of
finding a stable income. Ultimately he disregarded opportunities for
secure employment in academia, and began freelancing as translator
and researcher at the Association.36
Sharawy’s description of the six African youths he met there
illustrates the diversity of profiles it hosted in 1956. They were mostly
university students, one from South Sudan, two from Nigeria, both
supportive of the south eastern leader Namdi Izikwi, a fourth fromWest
Africa, and two from western and northern Eritrea. They all gravitated
around ‘the Professor’, Abd Al-Aziz Ishak, who led them in long
discussions about empire and resistance in Africa.37 Sharawy describes
Ishak as a liberal scholar with a satirical wit that often rattled the
technocrats who liaised with him from the African Affairs Bureau.38
For Sharawy, and for his African colleagues, the Association was a
haven of education and mentorship, amongst intellectuals with
genuine affection for their African students.
The Association’s community grew suddenly after Nasser’s
successful nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956.33 Fayiq; Ismael, 157–225; Joshua Nkomo, The Story of My Life (London: Methuen,
1984), 101–102.
34 Interview, Helmi Sharawy, Cairo, 30.8.17.
35 Helmi Sharawy, Sira Misriyya Ifriqiyya [An Egyptian African Story] (Cairo: Al-Ain,
2019), 102.
36 Sharawy, Sira, 99–100; Interview, Sharawy.
37 Sharawy, Sira, 14.
38 Sharawy, Sira, 154.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 165Britain, France and Israel’s joint attack on Egypt in October had
generated an unprecedented cascade of Afro-Asian solidarity with the
Egyptian people: ‘the sheer volume, universality, and scale of adverse
reaction to the British and French attack on Egypt shocked, sobered or
scandalised the supporters of the policy’.39 After Suez, the transnational
networks flowing through Cairo multiplied. Indeed Fayiq remem-
bers 1956 as a turning point for Egypt’s African relations: it both
emboldened Nasser and mitigated the difficulties Fayiq had faced in
locating African liberation movements.40 Several African movements
were attracted by Cairo’s victory, and began taking the initiative to
make contact. A case in point is Felix Moumié, leader of the Union of
the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), whose widow and fellow activist
Marthe wrote: ‘When we saw that Nasser could nationalize the Suez
Canal, resist theFrenchand theBritish, andwin,we said toourselves, this
is someone who can really help [the UPC]’.41 As Kenyan independence
activist and later vice presidentOgingaOdinga put it, ‘It was the abortive
Suez adventure of 1956 . . . that united all Africa, andAfrica with Asia
and the Arab world, to give a great spurt forward to national
independence . . . Africa was never the same after Suez . . . ’42
The second function that the Association now came to fulfil was to
enable communications amongst its African guests, and between them
and their bases at home. Meeting one another in Cairo, they could
escape their colonial administrations’ restrictions on their movement,
exchange skills and moral support, and broaden their networks. One of
the first delegations came from the Cameroons, headed by Felix
Moumié, with high hopes for a hearing in Egypt after Suez.43 Arriving
in July 1957, they found the Egyptian government had organised their
residence and office in Zamalek, as well as financial assistance.
Moumié’s widow Marthe recalls Nasser taking a particular interest in
the Cameroonian situation during his reception for the African
delegations a week later.44 She adds: ‘All the parties represented in
Cairo, with the support of the Egyptian government, had a spirit of
manifest solidarity. The Algerians, Ugandans, South Africans, and
Cameroonians consulted one another about strategies to adopt in their39 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1992), 392.
40 Fayiq, 24.
41 Marthe Moumié, Victime du Colonialisme: Mon Mari Félix Moumié [Victim of
Colonialism: My Husband Félix Moumié] (Paris: Duboiris, 2006), 100.
42 Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London: Heinemann, 1967), 175.
43 Moumié, 100.
44 Moumié, 99.
166 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019struggle against colonialism. The UPC office in . . . Zamalek, Cairo,
occupied an important place’.45
Similarly, Joshua Nkomo, president of the Zimbabwe African
People’s Union (ZAPU) and later Vice President of Zimbabwe,
recounts his route to Cairo via Accra’s All-African People’s Congress
in December 1958. His trajectory highlights the significance of the tide
of Third World political organising in facilitating introductions and
collaborations between liberation movements. Of Accra, he says, ‘the
most important thing that happened to me there was my new friendship
with a young man from Uganda, John Kale, a brilliant organiser who
helped me a great deal . . . He was organising Joseph Kiwanuka’s
Uganda National Congress from an office in Cairo, and he introduced
me to the leader of the Egyptian delegation, Dr [Fuad] Galal, and
his deputy Mohammed Mohammed Faiek’. Nkomo describes Nasser as
‘genuinely committed to national liberation in Africa’ and recalls
Galal inviting him to a meeting with the president following the
conference.46
Arriving in January 1959, Nkomo had just learned of the banning of
his organisation, and had begun making plans to return. Nasser advised
him to organise from Cairo instead, rather than return to jail: ‘I moved
into a more comfortable hotel, at Egyptian government expense, and
opened up a small office in the building of the African Association in
Zamalek . . . the channel through which President Nasser gave
support to liberation movements’. There he met Felix Moumié, and
John Kale, who ‘showed [him] all the techniques needed for running a
political office’.47 Alongside such opportunities, Nkomo’s account also
illustrates the limits curtailing the ambitious solidarity practices of a
recently colonised state like Egypt. He recalls that Egypt was not
especially well connected by phone and mail to southern Africa,
prompting his decision to move to London to be more effective. Here
again, however, he found support from Cairo when he left in July: ‘The
Egyptians raised no objection – indeed they even gave me some money
to live on for a time, and paid my airfare’.48
Whilst African activists’ meetings with state officials secured their
position in Egypt, it was members of the African Association who were
their main contacts and support in Cairo. For example in 1958, still in
his twenties and a new researcher at the Association, Helmi Sharawy45 Moumié, 102–103.
46 Nkomo, 77.
47 Nkomo, 79.
48 Nkomo, 81.
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Moumié (UPC), Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), and Ignatius Musaazi of the
Uganda National Congress Party (UNC). The continual movement
and shifting fortunes of such figures was intimately tied to the support
they received in Cairo, and to the exchanges they had with enthusiasts
for their cause in Egyptian political, intellectual and cultural circles. In
his memoir Sharawy explains how his volunteering for live interpreting
tasks with such figures had accelerated his rise in the ranks, and the
relaxed atmosphere in which his political experience was nurtured.49
He also describes the Association’s commemorations of national events
and festivals pertaining to different liberation movements.50
Beyond its physical centre, the Association provided a valuable
space in the media for African activists to disseminate their ideas and
experiences to audiences in Egypt and back home. In 1957, its members
began publishing the magazine Nahdat Afriqya [‘Africa Rising’], under
the editorship of Ishak and Egyptian poet Abdu Badawi. The
Association expressly sought to forge an African consciousness among
Egyptians, and Nahdat Afriqya announced itself the first Arabic
language magazine with this objective, fostering ‘familiarity amongst
Africans’, and ‘publishing research that is important to every
African’.51 It was a rich publication featuring first-hand accounts
from African politicians, a news roundup called ‘Africa in a Month’,
scholarly research on African history, book reviews, and letters from its
Arab-African readership.52 Published in Arabic, English, and French,
its editor called on writers from across the continent to contribute,
under the slogan ‘Africa for the Africans’.53
Meanwhile, the Association was able to generate new spaces for its
guests’ political expression and organising, by connecting them with
Cairo Radio’s nascent African broadcasts, providing both personnel
and content. In July 1954, programming had begun in Amharic,
Sudanese dialects, and Swahili.54 Cairo’s Swahili coverage was part of
Egyptian support for the Mau Mau uprising: on the one hand, with
news bulletins and press reviews highlighting Egyptian affairs, it
fostered familiarity between the two peoples, and promoted Egypt as a
regional ally. The first Swahili broadcast began by announcing: ‘Today
the people of the Nile Valley meet, on the ether, the sister people of49 Sharawy, Sira, 97–98.
50 ‘Al-Rabita Al-Ifriqiyya’ [The African Association],Nahdat Afriqya I, October 1957, 52.
51 Nahdat Afriqya II, December 1957, 2.
52 See Nahdat Afriqya II, December 1957, 42–46, 47–49, 54–57.
53 Ishak, ‘Introduction’, Nahdat Afriqya, Vol. I, October 1957.
54 Fayiq, 35–36.
FIGURE 1. Front cover of Nahdat Afriqya, January 1958.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 169East Africa . . . who have always had a special place in our hearts’.55
On the other hand, it exerted pressure on Britain, by reporting on
British violence against the Kenyans, on dissenting voices in British
parliament and society, and on other African liberation movements,
from Zanzibar, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia,
and South Africa.56
Through their use of language and translation, mass media such as
Nahdat Afriqya and Cairo Radio became important places for the
politics of African solidarity, articulated together by and with the
Association. However, this effort had important limits. The Nahdat
Afriqya team took care to translate summaries of its content into
English and French, aiming to foster an ‘imagined community’ con-
templating the same content across linguistic barriers simultaneously.
This effect was subject to the constraints of the Association’s resources,
both technically and financially, and circulation remained highest
in Egypt, as reflected in the Letters pages. Conversely, Cairo Radio
employed presenters directly from each movement, broadcast in their
own language. It sought to constitute its listeners as members of
national fighting fronts, but also of a wider African public, in which
Egyptians featured by their side. In both media, however, hailing Arab-
African publics into being in this way was limited by differences of class,
gender, and cultures across audiences, as well as differential attitudes to
Arab historical legacies in the continent, some of which were associated
with slavery, or colonialism in the case of Egypt and Sudan.CHANGING POLITICAL IMAGINARIES: FROM SUEZ TO THE CAIRO
CONFERENCEAfriIt was the first time that the colonised peoples could send their
representatives . . . despite colonisers’ borders and obstacles . . .
despite the iron curtain that the coloniser used to isolate the peoples
( . . . ) [The Cairo Conference] created a new field for meeting and
coordinating efforts, not only in Africa but extending to the peoples of
Asia and others . . . 57During the Free Officers’ first years in power, the production of Cairo as
a hub for liberation movements proceeded through the fostering of a55 ‘Broadcasts in Swahili’, SWB IV 481, 33, 3.7.54.
56 See ‘Appendix: Cairo in Swahili’, i–iv, SWB IV 558.
57 ‘Intishar Harakat Al-Tahrir fi-Afriqya’ [The Spread of Liberation Movements in
ca], Nahdat Afriqya, December 1957, 59–63.
170 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019networked physical presence for their members and supporters, with an
emphasis on the Arab world and Africa. With the Cairo Conference
in December 1957, a new phase was inaugurated in which the Afro-
Asian scale took prominence in Egyptians’ political imaginaries.
As Laura Bier observes, at this juncture after independence, ‘the
primacy of the nation-state as the locus of identity was largely taken for
granted . . . ’58 Contrary to the conventional wisdom on Egyptians’
mutually exclusive nationalist and pan-Arab commitments, those
engaged with the state’s radical project in the 1950s were undertaking a
far more complex reimagining of their identities and role on the world
stage. This was a dynamic process, unfolding first in the confrontation
over Suez, and then in the gathering of Afro-Asian representatives in
Cairo.
In both instances, Egyptians engaged in translocal organising
with Arab, African, and Asian counterparts, and this was generative
of new political imaginaries in turn. As Ruth Gilmore writes, soli-
darity practice remakes identifications through a creative process of
engagement: in ‘the context of shared opposition, the activists
“discovered” . . . which is to say created – shared values; in turn, that
collective work produced community solidarity, or political integra-
tion, enabling further action’.59 Specifically, I show that the experience
of Suez, and then their agenda-setting interactions at the conference,
moved Egyptian activists and writers from a solidarity which
foregrounded their common enemy, and proposed a shared project
in the future, towards a solidarity which substantiated a shared project
in the present. Having been observers of the broad trajectory launched
at Bandung, the delegates became authors of resolutions that they
would announce themselves for immediate implementation. As this
section will show, this was by no means a seamless transition, as
differences of class, language, and historical experience underpinned
power differentials that could interrupt the flow of solidarity.Suez: A Common Enemy and the Gift of Solidarity
There was a lively public debate about national identity already under-
way in the 1950s. Increasing numbers of publications were affirming the58 Bier, 155–156, 157.
59 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis and Opposition in
Globalising California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 238. See
Featherstone, 23.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 171salience of Egypt’s regional neighbourhoods, even if they differed on
the relative weight to be given to each. In 1954, Nasser himself had
published The Philosophy of the Revolution, which presents Egypt as
moving in three circles, Arab, African, and Islamic.60 He also wrote a
preface to HusseinMu’nis’ Egypt and its Message, which affirmed Egypt’s
African calling, but maintained the traditional nationalist trope of
Egypt’s contributions to European civilisation: ‘We are neither from
the Orient nor from the West, although we have a share in each of
them . . . ’61 In 1956, a policy statement entitled ‘Africa for the
Africans’ played up Egypt’s moral leadership and Islamic heritage in
Africa.62 Such texts arguably marshalled a conservative emphasis on
religious unity or nationalist tradition in order to balance their early,
radical words on Africa. By contrast, subsequent media and official
publications affirmed Egypt’s new alliances confidently. As leftist
historian Muhammad Anis wrote in a state-sponsored series, Nasser
went to Bandung to explore Egypt’s new role, ‘while earlier Egyptian
leaders would always go to London and Paris’.63
The struggle over Suez must be underlined as the crucial event
connecting Bandung with the Cairo Conference, and shaping the
Egyptian delegates’ identity narratives, for several reasons. First, the
extraordinary engagement of Arab, African, and Asian publics with
Egypt’s cause led many Egyptians to see themselves within wider and
overlapping spatial networks of anticolonial resistance. The central
trope here was that of the common enemy. This was a contingent
process that predated Suez, but one which came to a dramatic cresc-
endo in the second half of 1956. After securing British withdrawal in
1954, Egypt had faced renewed isolation through Britain’s promotion of
a Middle East security pact, and Israel’s attack on Egyptian troops in
Gaza in February 1955. The United States worsened this by making
military assistance conditional on a settlement with Israel. It was at
Bandung, after his embrace of neutralism, that Nasser was able to secure
arms from the Soviet bloc instead.64 Thus for Egyptians pursuing
meaningful sovereignty, the need to resist Western regional alliances60 Nasser, Falsafat Al-Thawra [The Philosophy of the Revolution] (Cairo: Madbuli,
2003, 1953), 57–61.
61 See Ismael, 106.
62 Likely authored by the so-called Supreme Council for African Affairs, this appeared
to reflect official thinking. As Sharawy recalls, however, this council was formed byNasser to
send a message regarding the civilian nature of Egyptian policy making, while the real
decisions remained in Fayiq’s hands: Sharawy, Sira, 121–127, cf. Ismael, 237.
63 Anis, 160.
64 Abou-El-Fadl, ‘Neutralism’.
172 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019had thrown the Arab scale into relief, while the isolation then imposed
by the Suez attack revealed Africa and the wider Afro-Asian space as
generous spaces of translocal solidarity. In successive struggles with the
Western bloc, Egyptians had discovered their need for support in Asia
and Africa, and in a fluid process of introductions, sharing, and
organising in spaces such as the Cairo Conference, they had begun to
identify with one another. As Brown and Yaffe emphasise, ‘relations of
solidarity can travel in more than one direction simultaneously,
building complex webs of reciprocity’.65
It was the gift of popular solidarity with Egypt across Africa and Asia
that raised Egypt’s profile internationally, and elicited the invitation to
host the first Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference. In December
1956, after the Asian Writers Conference in New Delhi, the ASC
permanent committee had decided to send a delegation to Cairo. Four
ASC secretaries, Indian Anup Singh, Russian Anatoly Sefernov,
Chinese Yang Shou, and Japanese Masharu Hatanaka arrived in
February 1957 and met with Nasser, who confirmed his agreement to
host the conference.66 Egypt’s leadership knew how to capitalise on
this: Nasser had relied on a popular base to buoy Egypt through the Suez
trial, and now used it to strengthen Egypt’s Third World profile. Thus
Suez brought together a trajectory of grassroots solidarity with state
policy, which saw the articulation of Cairo with other Afro-Asian
locales, and enabled the convening of the 1957 Conference.
Finally, the Suez experience deepened the so-called ‘Bandung
moment’ in Egypt – specifically the rapprochement between Nasser
and the Egyptian left – which shaped the composition of Egypt’s
delegation to the Cairo Conference. On the one hand, after Bandung
and Suez, Nasser had realised the political leverage afforded by
adopting more radical positions, which prompted an engagement with
the communist bloc and Egypt’s own leftists.67 Until 1954, crackdowns
on opposition had seen many such figures jailed, and even leftist Free
Officers such as Khalid Muhyi Al-Din exiled.68 Now, the government
was keen to work with the left, aiming to enhance its own technocratic
ranks with leftist intellectuals’ superior capacities in theorisation,
planning, and public discourse. On the other hand, Nasser’s feats in65 Gavin Brown and Helen Yaffe, ‘Practices of Solidarity: Opposing Apartheid in the
Centre of London’, Antipode 46, no. 1 (2014): 35.
66 Anis, 198.
67 Anouar Abdel Malek, Egypt, Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social
Change under Nasser (New York: Random House, 1968), 116.
68 Khalid Muhyi Al-Din, Wa Al’aan Atakallam [And Now I Speak] (Cairo: Al-Ahram,
1992), 323–351.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 173securing arms and the Suez nationalisation had delighted audiences
in the Arab world, and triggered a ‘fascination with Nasserism’69
amongst the Egyptian left, whose members had a strong tradition of
theorising Arab nationalism within their socialism.70 Its different
factions now adopted a strategy of unification amongst themselves
and cooperation with the state: ‘Nasser’s change in foreign policy was
an important element in shifting the orientation of the Egyptian
communists’.71
The conference delegation therefore included both Free Officers
such as Muhyi Al-Din, and recently released Marxist intellectuals, who
endeavoured to pull the government left. There was also an array of
liberal and nationalist public intellectuals, who were content to support
and generate publicity for the government project. These included
Egypt’s foremost man of letters Taha Hussein, celebrated novelists
Nagib Mahfouz and Ihsan Abd Al-Qudus, and influential journalists
Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Ahmad Bahaa’ Al-Din, and Zakariyya
Lutfi Gum‘a. The calibre of this team reflects the importance that the
Egyptian government attributed to the conference, and also meant that
rigorous and critical deliberations would ensue. This said, the Free
Officers’ rule was characterised by its close surveillance of the political
field in Egypt and its wariness of independent organising. The Afro-
Asian conference was accordingly subject to state supervision, with two
military men placed in charge of its preparatory committee: senior Free
Officer Anwar Sadat as preparatory committee and conference chair,
and Yusuf Al-Siba‘i as secretary. Sadat was a right-leaning figure,
formerly secretary of the short-lived Islamic Congress, and described in
Nkomo’s memoir as ‘not remotely interested in Africa’.72 Al-Siba‘i
moved from his military background into a career as novelist and editor
with an uncritical pro-government line. Ultimately this meant that the
implementation of decisions remained to a large degree in state hands.
However, this choice did not mean that the critical voices in Egypt’s
delegations were silenced. As the subsequent sections show, the
conference appeared on a scene already vibrant with personalities and
institutions engaged critically but sympathetically with the state policy
of Afro-Asian solidarity.69 Sa‘eed Rahmi cited in Ismael and Rifat El-Said, The Communist Movement in Egypt,
1920–1988 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 107.
70 Abdel Malek, 264–273.
71 Ismael and El-Said, 82.
72 Nkomo, 78.
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The Cairo Conference had come to its Egyptian hosts from an Asian
solidarity movement trajectory in which they had not been much
involved, but they now adopted several liberation causes fromAsia and
Africa. Meanwhile they endeavoured to secure recognition and support
for the concerns they had carried alone thusfar, seeking to channel
participating delegations’ energies towards an Egyptian rendering of the
meaning of Afro-Asian solidarity. Significantly, they were constructing
this Afro-Asianism in tandem with Egypt’s pan-Arabism, at a
particularly tumultuous time for the Arab world. Egypt’s merger with
Syria into the United Arab Republic was announced within days of the
Cairo Conference, sharpening the polarisation between the anti-
imperialist republics and the pro-Western monarchies in the so-called
Arab Cold War of the 1950s. Examining the delegates’ interactions at
the Cairo Conference, I chart their adoption of African and Asian
liberation movements’ causes as their own, and their effort to set the
Afro-Asian agenda to include causes hitherto considered exclusively
‘Arab’. Through such connections, they endeavoured to constitute
themselves as subjects at home in Arab, African, and later Afro-Asian
worlds, in a specifically Egyptian internationalism. Conferences were
important venues for diplomatic sociability, and for securing consensus
on agendas and priority issues which could then be transposed to other
fora, both international and popular.73 From 1958 onwards, Egypt’s
influence meant that ‘Arab’ issues were tabled in any Afro-Asian
forum. Egyptian efforts were critical to the assimilation of Algeria and
Palestine, but also Tunisia, Morocco, and Yemen, into the core causes
and critiques of anti-imperialists in Afro-Asian and later Euro-
American movements.
This process had begun in earnest with the preparations for
Bandung. In the preceding Arab League meetings, Egypt tabled the
issues of Palestine and North Africa alongside African liberation, racial
discrimination in Africa, and disarmament, and secured an agreement
from fellowArab states to send delegates who would vote with Egypt on
Palestine.74 There was an agreement to send the Arab League’s General
Secretary Abd Al-Khaliq Hassouna within Egypt’s delegation, and to73 Ruth Craggs, ‘Postcolonial Geographies, Decolonization, and the Performance of
Geopolitics at Commonwealth Conferences’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35, no.
1 (2014): 39–55; Naoko Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference
of 1955’, Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2014): 225–252.
74 See ‘The Presentation of Arab Issues at Bandung’, SWB IV 560, 23, 9.4.55 and
Ismael, 31.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 175get observer status for Arab countries which were not yet indepen-
dent.75 Egypt also led the Arab insistence on getting Israel uninvited,
and was supported by Pakistan and Indonesia.76 Nasser persuaded
Indian premier and Bandung co-convenor Jawaharlal Nehru to agree to
the discussion of the question of Palestine, as well as to support Egypt’s
resolution.77
At Bandung, Nasser’s powerful emphases on the North African and
Palestinian problems were echoed and endorsed by Tunisian, Algerian,
and Moroccan delegates who were being hosted as political exiles in
Cairo,78 as well as other Arab delegates. Cairo Radio’s ‘Voice of the
Arabs’ reported approvingly: ‘Egypt made these issues her own from the
very first moment of discussion, and Abd Al-Nasir . . . expressed
his appreciation for the continued attention paid by the members of the
Asian bloc to the North African dispute . . . ’79 The Egyptian
delegation’s efforts resulted in the Final Communiqué recording its
support for several Arab liberation causes. Under ‘The Problems of
Dependent Peoples’ and ‘Cultural Cooperation’, it supported the rights
to independence of Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians, and under
‘Other’, it called for the implementation of United Nations resolutions
on the rights of Arab Palestinians, and supported the position of South
Yemen.80 Bandung also generated a ten-point Declaration of which one
clearly endorsed Egypt’s struggle against the Baghdad Pact: ‘Abstention
from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the
particular interests of any of the big powers’.81 These were not small
victories, given the presence of delegates such as Atlantic Pact member
Turkey, and delegates from Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, who were less
than enthused by Nasser’s proposals for Arab collective security away
from the British.
One of the leftist delegates to the 1957Conference, MahmudAmin
Al-Alim, observed that ‘the Arabs now realise the importance of going
out to the world with their causes and issues’.82 This made ‘Arab’ issues75 Ismael, 31.
76 For official Israeli reaction, see ‘Dr Eytan on the Bandung Conference’, Voice of Zion,
SWB IV 560, 21, 10.4.55.
77 Ismael, 30.
78 ‘An Interview with Salah Ben Yousif’, SWB IV 561, 21–22; ‘Mohammed Khaidar’s
[Khider] Broadcasts’, 22–23; ‘A Statement by ‘Allal Al-Fasi’, 23–24, 17-8.5.55.
79 ‘Abd Al-Nasir’s Speech on the North Africa Issue’, SWB IV 563, 24, 21.5.55.
80 See Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Interventions 11, no. 1
(2009): 97, 100; see also Anis, 162.
81 Final Communiqué, 102.
82 Al-Alim, ‘Tawsiyyat Al-Mu’tamar’ [Recommendations of the Conference], Al-Risala
Al-Gadida, January 1958.
176 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019far more prominent in the preparatory committee’s agenda and the
eventual agenda setting for the conference, than they had been at
Bandung.83 Indeed at theOctober 1957PreparatoryMeeting, the second
agreed agenda item was the Algerian situation, after Algerian delegate
Ahmad Tawfiq Madani successfully requested separate consideration.84
Under ‘Other Issues’, delegates agreed to send a letter of support to the
Syrian people and government for their steadfastness during their recent
standoffwithTurkey, amessage to theUnitedNations Secretary-General
regarding the Syrian events, a memorandum to the General Assembly
President on Algerian liberation, and even a message to the Egyptian
people on the first anniversary of Suez.85 On both the Syrian and the
Algerian issues, the Turkish delegate Ali Belge refused to endorse the
committee’s statements – in a repeat of Turkish diplomat Fatin Rüştü
Zorlu’s behaviour at Bandung86 – but came up against a balance of
attendees that opposed his view.87With the two sub-committees formed
for agenda and administrative matters headed by Egyptian Al-Siba‘i and
Indian Singh respectively, and given their support for Syria’s position,
Turkey’s influence was weakened.
At the Cairo Conference itself, delegates from India, Cameroon,
Indonesia, Japan, and Sudan all gave reports, on their own national
liberation struggles, on challenges they confronted such as racial
discrimination and the threat of nuclear weapons, and on the promotion
of economic development and cultural exchange.88 Meanwhile,
Egyptian contributions such as Free Officer Khalid Muhyi Al-Din’s
address on neoimperialism made comparisons betweenWestern security
pacts in the Middle East, the Far East, and South-East Asia, and
enumerated theanticolonial causes ofWest Irian in Indonesia andGoa in83 The Cairo Conference preparatory committee included twenty-one states:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, China, Jordan, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, USSR and
Republic of Vietnam. It sent invitations to 55 countries, and the publicity was rigorous,
including a decision to hold an ‘Afro-Asian Week’ from 1–8 December 1957 in Egypt as a
prelude: Anis, 202, 220.
84 See Anis, 200, 217. The agreed agenda was 1. The international situation and its
effect on Afro-Asian nations, 2. The Algerian situation, 3. Colonialism and national
independence, 4. Combating nuclear weapons, 5. Racism, 6. Coordination of economic and
technical skills, 7. Coordination of efforts towards cultural cooperation, 8. Other issues.
85 ‘Ma‘rad Al-Shahr’ [The Month’s Exhibition], Nahdat Afriqya II, December 1957,
37–39.
86 Zeki Küneralp, trans. Geoffrey Lewis, Just a Diplomat (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992),
56–57.
87 Anis, 210–216.
88 See Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1958), 4. The final agenda saw the addition of ‘The conditions of woman and child’.
See 7.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 177India in particular.89 At the same time, his speech focused on Western
designs on the Middle East, and the colonisation of Arab states. The
Egyptiandelegation thensecureda resolutiononAlgeriawhichdescribed
the Frenchas engaged in awar of extermination, and called on thepeople
of Africa and Asia to mobilise public opinion through press campaigns
and demonstrations insisting on France respecting the Geneva
Conventions on the Laws of War.90 On Palestine, the conference had
begun with the Palestinian delegation’s submission of a report and a
proposal for a resolution on support for the Palestinians’ right of return.91
The final conference declaration then fully endorsed the Palestinian
delegation’s report. Whereas Bandung’s final communiqué contained
just a few lines on Palestine, here was a longer historical account, which
pointed to Israel’s ‘aggressive expansionist nature’, and its military and
financial support by the United States. It described the Zionist project as
‘growing along racial expansion lines . . . specifically aiming at the
expulsion of Arabs from their country’.92 Indeed persuading African
interlocutors of comparisons with apartheid South Africa was fast
becoming an important element of Egyptian policy.93 As the ‘Voice of
the Arabs’ had argued before Bandung: ‘The conference is a call for
freedomand equality.Nowonder Israel was not invited . . . !Nowonder
South Africa . . . did not respond to the invitation!’94
Meanwhile the Cultural Resolutions of the conference recom-
mended the provision of scholarships and facilities to enable Algerians
and Palestinians to study at schools and universities across Africa and
Asia, in the context of the repression of teachers and students under
colonial rule.95 This overall trend continued beyond the founding
conference and was stronger yet at the 1959 Youth Conference, where
Palestinian refugees made up part of the UAR delegation, and where
AAPSO Youth delegates were taken on a trip to Gaza as part of their
stay.9689 Khalid Muhyi Al-Din, “‘Imperialism and Upholding the Peoples’ Rights for
Independence and Sovereignty”: Report by Khaled Mohieddin, Egypt’, Afro-Asian Peoples’
Solidarity Conference, 81–86.
90 Resolutions, First Conference, 39.
91 Al-Ahram, 26.12.57, 5.
92 Resolutions, 42.
93 Sharawy, ‘The Presence of African Liberation Movements in Egypt after the
Bandung Conference in 1955’, in The Future We Chose: Emerging Perspectives on the
Centenary of the ANC, ed. Busani Ngcaweni (Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa,
2013).
94 ‘Israel and South Africa’, SWB IV 563, 19, 19.5.55.
95 Resolutions, 62.
96 Al-Idha‘a [The Radio], Cairo, February 1959.
IGURE 2. Crowds outside the conference opening ceremony at Cairo
niversity. Source: Al-Ahram, 27 December 1957.
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UA critical limitation to this gain was that the problem of Zionism
was not one that could easily be appreciated across Afro-Asian spaces.
Connections had been forged between Israeli and Afro-Asian socialists
in the precursors to Bandung such as the Asian Socialist Conference,
and Israel was offering diplomatic and economic assistance to its
African interlocutors, presenting itself as a fellow newly independent
state.97 This was compounded by another limitation in turn: the
rivalries and competing interpretations of solidarity in the Afro-Asian
space of other influential powers, such as the staunchly pan-Africanist97 See McCann and Lewis in this issue.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 179Kwame Nkrumah. Israel’s activism had proven notably effective in
Ghana, where Nkrumah convened the All-African Independent
Peoples’ Conference in April 1958, on the heels of the Cairo Confe-
rence, followed by the All-African Peoples’ Congress in December,
while resisting Egypt’s counsel on the question of Palestine throughout.
In later years, Israel’s expansionism in Africa in particular would
become a grave challenge for Egypt, and it would find support in its
conflicts with Israel lacking, particularly among the more conservative
states who went on to form the Monrovia Group.98 Sharawy recalls
trying to explain to his friend and ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo in 1958
the similarities between Rhodesia and Palestine, Algeria, Kenya and
South Africa, as all subject to settler colonial regimes, but finding the
Zionist movement’s strong presence in South Africa in particular an
obstacle to Nkomo’s grasp of the comparison.99Becoming Afro-Asian: A Shared Project
If these were the kinds of interactions Egyptians had at the conference,
what was the effect on their political imaginaries? In the run-up to the
Cairo Conference in late 1957, the Egyptian preparatory committee
began to articulate their Arab andAfro-Asian identities in the Egyptian
cultural press. This is illustrated well by a comparison of Nahdat
Afriqya’s coverage of the conference, and that of Al-Risala Al-Gadida, a
cultural magazine edited by conference secretary Al-Siba‘i which fea-
tured commentary from members of the Egyptian delegation’s Cultural
Committee. Even though the African Association did not have a
formal presence at the conference, it was represented, whether by the
correspondents who sent reports,100 or the African conference
delegates whom it hosted in Cairo. Both magazines covered the event
extensively, asking similar questions regarding Egyptian delegates’
impressions of their guests, and their ‘duties . . . in implementing the
conference’s recommendations’.10198 See Sharawy, Sira, 102–105; Sharawy and Awatif Abd Al-Rahman, Isra’il wa Afriqiya:
1948–1985 [Israel and Africa: 1948–1985] (Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, 1985).
99 Sharawy, Sira, 44.
100 Areen Abd Al-Hamid, ‘Ala Hamish Al-Mu’tamar: Ahrar Asya [On the Margins of
the Conference: The Free of Asia], Nahdat Afriqya III, January 1958, 9.
101 Enayat Al-Khurazati, ‘Udaba’ wa-Fananu Misr fi-Mu’tamar Al-Shu‘ub Al-Ifriqiyya
Al-Asyawiyya’ [The Writers and Artists of Egypt in the Afro-Asian People’s Conference],
Al-Risala Al-Gadida, February 1958.
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and the two publications used the motif of Egypt’s national victory at
Suez as an Afro-Asian one. This offered Egyptian audiences new
coordinates for the resonance of this event, not only in the Arab but
the Afro-Asian space too. At the conference, Anwar Sadat had
addressed the delegations: ‘In expressing her gratitude . . . Egypt . . .
recognizes that the only way of repaying her debt to you is by taking an
active part in the task of liberating the rest of those peoples whose fates
are still being dominated by imperialistic regimes’.102 In Nahdat
Afriqya, Ishak echoed this by asserting that ‘Colonialism was broken,
and its prestige evaporated in Port Said’.103 In Al-Risala Al-Gadida,
Marxist Lutfi Al-Khuli similarly affirmed that the choice of Cairo
for AAPSO headquarters was ‘a clear sign of these peoples’
appreciation for the struggle of the Egyptian people in particular
and the Arabs in general against colonialism’.104 In the same issue, Al-
Siba‘i clarified: ‘People always talked about pharaonic Egypt, but now
Egypt has a different significance amongst nations: leader of the
colonised . . . ’105
While Suez was juxtaposed with the common enemy in the West,
contributors also harnessed the trope of civilisation to assert their new
orientation eastwards and enthusiastic adoption of African and
Asian causes. Thus, in Nahdat Afriqya, Ishak called the conference a
‘civilisational step’ for eastern civilisations, which he deemed closer to
Egypt’s own than that of the West. Ishak criticised the way in which
European civilisation had become the model for colonised peoples, and
emphasised that African peoples’ histories were steeped in ‘elements of
modernity’, citing ‘rational thought, humane feelings, ancient religions
and generous values’.106 His descriptions of the conference aimed to
celebrate this heritage, and Egypt’s central place:Gad
SoliIn one of the great halls of Cairo – which has seen 1000 years of
civilisation of East, West and South – wise men from India, poets from
China, heroes from Indonesia, cultured youth fromGhana, Cameroon,
Kenya, and Somalia, and the rest of the rising continent’s nations,
expressed the hopes of ancient Afro-Asian human civilisation, which102 ‘Address by Anwar Sadat’, First Conference, 8.
103 Ishak, ‘Thamrat’, 6.
104 Al-Khurazati.
105 Al-Siba‘i, ‘Kharig Al-Nitaq Al-‘Arabi’ [Beyond the Arab Sphere], Al-Risala Al-
ida, February 1958.
106 Ishak, ‘Thamrat Al-Tadamun Al-Ifriqi Al-Asyawi’ [The Fruits of Afro-Asian
darity], Nahdat Afriqya III, January 1958.
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Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 181aims at construction . . . fraternity and elevation, respect of humans
for one another.107Ishak’s language illustrates both the endurance of colonial binaries of
backwardness and civilisation, and the new ways in which Egyptians
negotiated these. The latter ranged from asserting their own singular
civilisational trajectory, to now locating themselves within a greater
ontological unit and asserting its parity with, but difference from, the
colonialWest. Meanwhile, inAl-Risala Al-Gadida, Cultural Committee
delegates echoed this trope in expressing their new Afro-Asian
affinities, stating that they had ‘absorbed more than enough from
Western cultures’.108
The conference debates on cultural exchange had provided a space
for the elaboration of a shared project109 – as compared to focusing on a
shared enemy – in the production of an Egyptian, Afro-Asian identity.
The theme of Egypt’s own distinct trajectory was strongly present, but
there was also a pledge to fuse this with new cultural sources.
Significantly, this had come from a preeminent liberal nationalist, and
longtime advocate of Egypt’s Mediterranean identity and European
ties, Taha Hussein. As Egypt’s Cultural Committee chair, Hussein had
spoken at length about ‘Egypt’s gift to world culture’, but also
announced ‘that the Egyptian mind . . . the mind of the intellectuals,
and of those seeking to learn, welcome most deeply the fruits of what
the Asian and African countries’ minds produce . . . ’110
Indeed Hussein’s speech revolved around translation in Egyptian
and Arab history, which was a theme that animated conference
proceedings on cultural exchange. It appeared in conference secretary
Al-Siba‘i’s call for a nationally coordinated literary translation
programme, and leading actress Fatin Hamama and director Salah
Abu Sayf’s call ‘to realise the exchange of films on the widest possible
scale’.111 Novelist Nagib Mahfuz and editor Ahmad Bahaa’ Al-Din
insisted that the Egyptian state facilitate travel and collaboration
between Egyptian and Afro-Asian writers, to enable ‘the establishment
of Afro-Asian literature, which will emerge out of spiritual and moral
cooperation . . . These [writers] will be better placed for this than107 Ibid.
108 Abd Al-Salam Sharif, quoted in Al-Khurazati.
109 See Berenskoetter and Yuri van Hoef, ‘Friendship and Foreign Policy’, Oxford
yclopaedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (2017), 6.
110 Taha Hussein, ‘Tanmiyat Al-Tabadul Al-Thaqafi’ [The Development of Cultural
hange], Speech for the Egyptian Delegation, Al-Risala Al-Gadida, February 1958.
111 Al-Khurazati.
182 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019European and American writers who are well-meaning but have
not lost the perspective of the tourist, coming from very different
cultures . . . ’112
The delegates’ comments further specify the features of the shared
project, illustrating the relational ways in which they constructed and
employed their Arab andAfro-Asian national identity narratives. Thus
Marxist Lutfi Al-Khuli revealed the diverse causes which Egyptians
now adopted as their own from the Afro-Asian sphere: ‘the Egyptian
writer is required today . . . to draw his pen in the face of nuclear
weapons, human exploitation, and racial discrimination . . . ’ while
the Egyptian and Arab spheres were encouraged to open up to ‘new
trends of thought and culture’.113 In describing the Egyptian writer’s
commitments, Al-Khuli articulated multiple internationalist scales:
they came, he said, ‘from his position as Arab and then as Afro-Asian
and lastly as a human’.114 As Liu puts it, ‘Afro-Asian writers
were striving toward a new humanism—a universalism about life and
liberty—that was pitted against colonial violence’.115
Nahdat Afriqya further combined the Arab with Afro-Asian frames
through stories such as ‘Madagascar: The Asian-African Island’ or by
celebrating the Egyptian-Syrian merger as forming the first truly Afro-
Asian state.116 In providing a hall of fame of modernist leaders from the
East, for example, Ishak grouped together Islamic modernist Jamal Al-
Afghani with China’s founder Sun Yat Sen, alongside Egyptian
anticolonial nationalist Ahmad Urabi, Libyan fighter Al-Sunusi, and
Riffian revolutionary Abd Al-Krim Khatabi.117 Meanwhile in the post-
conference issue of Al-Risala Al-Gadida, the tale of Arab folk hero Abu
Zayd Al-Hilali was retold, emphasising his Arab, Asian and African
connections each time.118 In the same issue, an analysis of Cairo
Radio’s ‘special programmes’ stressed their role in ‘reshaping our culture
into local, Arab and internationalist’. The author described Egyptians’
Arab and Afro-Asian identities as a series of widening perspectives:
‘We were until recently closed in on ourselves, colonised . . . Now112 Mahfuz in Al-Khurazati.
113 Al-Khuli in Al-Khurazati.
114 Ibid.
115 Lydia Liu, ‘The Eventfulness of Translation: Temporality, Difference and Competing
Universals’, Translation, Spring (2014).
116 See Nahdat Afriqya III, January 1958, 34–36.
117 Ishak, ‘Thamrat’, 4.
118 Zakariyya Al-Higawi, ‘Abu Zayd Al-Hilali: ‘Arabi, Asyawi, Ifriqi’ [Abu Zayd Al-
Hilali: Arab, Asian, African], Al-Risala Al-Gadida, January 1958, 42–45.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 183many events . . . have drawn new horizons in front of us. We now have
to see ourselves as part of humanity . . . ’119
While writers and artists engaged in this co-construction of Arab
and Afro-Asian identities, it is important to note the challenges that
confronted their dissemination, as was the case with the pan-Arabist
nation making project.120 Afro-Asian solidarity activists had to
contend with the difference between their own experiences and
visions, and those of Egyptians whose political culture was shaped by
local references and an attachment to Egypt’s distinct national identity.
Particularly when combined with lingering tropes of civilisational
superiority, this could undermine the solidarity framework. There was a
concerted effort from state institutions to increase the popularly
available literature on Africa and Asia, and to make relevant changes
to the school and university curricula.121 However such measures could
not bring about shifts in societal attitudes swiftly enough for
Association members like Sharawy, who bemoaned insufficient
investment in cultural education around Arab-African relations in
particular.122A GROWING HUB: AAPSO JOINS THE AFRICAN ASSOCIATION
For its Egyptian hosts, a significant outcome of the 1957 Conference
was that Cairo was now a firmly fixed presence on the Afro-Asian
political map. They had demonstrated their ability to host and coordi-
nate a vast array of delegates and ideas, and this had been politically
productive – facilitating and strengthening connections between
delegates across borders, and helping to clarify and argue for an
Egyptian Afro-Asian political imaginary. The conference resolutions
then added an important new node to the infrastructure of translocal
solidarity practised by its hosts: they announced the formation of
AAPSO, with a permanent secretariat to be based in Cairo, Egypt. This
section examines the founding of AAPSO and the ways in which it
enhanced both the rootedness and mobility of activist networks in
Cairo. It should be clear that AAPSO was not the beginning of Third119 Bahig Nassar, ‘Al-Idha‘a wa-Thaqafatuna Al-Gadida’ [The Radio and Our New
Culture], Al-Risala Al-Gadida, September 1958.
120 See Abdel Malek, 256–262.
121 See Ismael, 104–107, Jacques Baulin, The Arab Role in Africa (London: Penguin,
1962), 51.
122 Sharawy, Sira, 152.
184 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019World internationalism in Egypt, but was rather an addition to
a dynamic existing framework. AAPSO was an international
organisation, however, unlike the African Association – its relation-
ship to high politics differed as a result. Below I discuss the influence of
the different states involved with Afro-Asianism on AAPSO, and the
opportunities and important limits this generated for its solidarity
practices.
As AAPSO was being set up, the African Association was
going from strength to strength. An immediate consequence of the
Cairo Conference was the Association’s swelling into the liberation
movement base whose reputation came to be known across
decolonising Africa. The opportunities it afforded these movements
for situated mobility now multiplied. After the conference, Al-Ahram
featured interviews with several African delegates who had managed to
evade colonial border controls to make it to Cairo, and who were now
effectively claiming asylum.123 They included a resistance fighter with
the Kenyan Mau Mau, a delegate from French Sudan who had claimed
he was travelling to France, and Chad delegation president, Zakariya
Nimr Yusuf, whose delegation had obtained pilgrimage visas for Hijaz,
the only destination the authorities allowed. Also covered was the story
of John Kale, the Ugandan student leader just 22 years of age, whom
Nkomo would meet a year later. Kale was then Foreign Relations
Secretary of the Ugandan National Congress, and would now become
its first representative in Cairo, given a base at the African Association,
and an influential voice on Cairo Radio.124
Meanwhile an elegant Nile-side villa was found to host the new
Afro-Asian organisation in Cairo’s Manial district. Its main tasks were
to be the implementation of the conference resolutions, the promotion
of Afro-Asian solidarity movements, and the provision of a link
between them. A modus vivendi developed gradually with the African
Association, whereby any liberation movement based in Cairo would
propose a principal resident in the African Association, and a
representative in the AAPSO Secretariat – this could be the same
person, or and assistant. As Sharawy recalls, this new arrangement
placed him and the AAPSO in competition for these liberation
movements’ attention.125123 ‘The Story of Those Who Came to Participate in the Conference and Will Not
Return!’, Al-Ahram, 2.1.58, 3.
124 See Ismay Milford, “‘Shining Vistas” and False Passports: Recipes for an Anti-
colonial Hub’, Afro-Asian Visions online blog, 2017; Sharawy, Sira, 172.
125 Sharawy, Sira, 102.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 185A division of labour also evolved to distinguish AAPSO’s activities
from those of others in Cairo. The African Association and later the
presidency’s African and Arab Affairs Bureaux provided politicised
spaces from which liberation movements could communicate with
their constituencies at home, associate with one another, and promote
their political thought in written and broadcast forms. Meanwhile
AAPSO also provided a fixed venue and resources, but promoted a
different kind of mobility: delegates were able to represent themselves
directly at foreign embassies and international organisations in Cairo,
by accompanying their Egyptian hosts. This also allowed them to
convey their message to non-African audiences at international
conferences, whether in Cairo or abroad, again by accompanying
Egyptian invitees.126 An example comes from Marthe Moumié, who
recalls that her husband began to receive messages of support from
China during their stay in Cairo, and describes how contacts with
China multiplied thereafter, followed in 1958 by a visit on the
invitation of the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity committee.127
For the Egyptian leadership, and those writers and activists affiliated
with it, AAPSOwas also an important theatre in which to present their
priorities and to engage dynamically with much stronger powers. At
both the 1957 Conference and 1959 Youth Conference, Cairo played
host and facilitator to both the Soviets and Chinese, navigating their
complex relations, as well as their reactions to Egypt’s own treatment of
its communist movement. Contemporary accounts make much of the
Soviet presence in particular,128 and left-leaning intellectuals such as
Anis were greatly enthused by this ‘new gathering of liberation powers
in the world, both socialist and nationalist’.129 By contrast, the
scholarship on AAPSO has often indulged in the language of fronts,
presenting its members as puppets of the Soviet World Peace Council
or as mouthpieces of Chinese propaganda.130
It is more precise to look at the organisation as having provided,
through Cairo, a place for both powers to communicate with, and
mobilise among, the world’s liberation wave. There were three parties
in this dynamic, and their relative power balances were not static. In
this respect, a further political role for AAPSO from Egypt’s perspective
was as pressure balancer between the Soviet and Chinese poles of the126 Sharawy, Interview; Moumié, 103.
127 Moumié, 102–103.
128 ‘Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Delegates Start to Arrive’, Al-Ahram, 23.12.57.
129 Anis, 225–226.
130 See Neuhauser.
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relations at different points, and the political weight of each power
could be asserted through their expenditure on representatives’ travel,
and sponsorship of AAPSO activities. However from AAPSO’s
1958–1959 beginnings onwards, the two powers were balanced by the
efforts of Egypt as the host to assert its own neutralist interpretations,
not least as Nasser’s rapprochement with the left grew cold, and was
followed by renewed repression – for reasons relating to intra-Arab
relations rather than Cold War dynamics – in 1959.131 Even in 1957,
before the Cairo Conference, Egyptian preparatory committee member
Zakariyya Lutfi Guma had completed an Africa tour aimed to assure
fellow participants of Egypt’s neutral stance.
AAPSO had a complex relationship with the Egyptian state, which
at times enhanced, and at others limited the possibilities of translocal
solidarity in Cairo. First, it had significant funding, starting with a
government pledge of 10,000 Egyptian pounds annually to launch it,
and enjoyed the support of major powers in its permanent secretariat.
This comprised representatives from Egypt, India, Algeria, Russia, and
China. This group had met on 3 January for the first time, and begun by
setting 1March as a day for coordinated action against nuclear weapons
tests, and 30 March as a Day of Solidarity with Algeria.132 However,
even as the government openly promoted AAPSO, and had sought
collaboration with the left at the Cairo Conference, this was still to be
carefully regulated. AAPSO was to operate within the parameters of
the existing system of Arab socialism, which stressed a national, non-
communist trajectory towards social justice and redistribution.133
AAPSO’s permanent staff were Yusuf Al-Siba‘i and two aides, the
linguist Mursi Saad Eddin and author Edward Al-Kharat. Historian
Anouar Abdel Malek stresses that this was a conservative choice of
team, aimed at ‘neutralising’ any communist influence after the energy
displayed by Marxist delegates at the Cairo Conference.134
Around the African Association and AAPSO were several other
groups, affiliated to differing degrees with the state, and tasked with
implementing policies in Africa and Asia. The Supreme Council,131 See Abdel Malek, 232–233.
132 See ‘Barnamag Al-Mu’tamar fi-Yum Wahid Maris’, [The Conference’s Programme
on 1 March], Al-Nashra Al-Ifriqiyya Al-Asyawiyya [Afro-Asian Bulletin], May 1958, 4;
McGregor and Hearman, 168.
133 See Ahmad Al-Mulla, Al-Yasar Al-Misri bayn ‘Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Sadat: Majallat Al-
Tali’a, 1965–1977 [The Egyptian Left between Abdel Nasser and Sadat: Al-Tali’a,
1965–1977] (Cairo: Dar Al-Kutub, 2014).
134 Abdel Malek, 232.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 187formed in January 1956, comprised high-ranking figures such as the
Interior and Finance Ministers, and some diplomats, but did not
compare in its influence with African Affairs Bureau chief Muhammad
Fayiq.135 In 1958, after the Cairo Conference, there was a recognition
at the executive level that a more complex infrastructure was needed to
support Egypt’s new role.136 This began with Fayiq expanding the
African Affairs Bureau in the presidency and National Defence Coun-
cil. From there he worked with other actors, among which AAPSO sat
alongside the African Association as well as Egypt’s Federation of Trade
Unions (EFTU) as non-state organisations. Ahmad Fahim, vice
president at the EFTU’s founding in 1957, and president from 1962,
had strong ties with several of his counterparts in Africa, despite the
controls on labour activity in Egypt. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
expanded its diplomatic representation in the newly independent
African states, but according to Sharawy, was focused on Arab affairs.
To the African Affairs Bureau, it remained primarily a source of
information through its Research Directorate.137 Another venue for
information was the Institute of African Studies, formed at Cairo
University in 1958, from narrower origins in Sudanese Studies. This
year saw the emergence of a more extensive and permanent institu-
tional set-up for Egypt’s Afro-Asian solidarity policy, with elements
operating at varying distances from the state.
In later years, both the African Association and AAPSO would try
to host liberation movements regardless of their pro-Soviet or Maoist
sympathies, and to avoid becoming embroiled in that rivalry. According
to Sharawy, there were at times tensions ‘between Zamalek and
Maniyal’ over which liberation movements were worthy of support.138
After all, Egyptian engagements with both Russia and China extended
to other critical areas such as trade and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it
was these that would often dictate Egypt’s fluctuating positions in this
dynamic.139 These are the complexities revealed by breaking down
Cold War frameworks, and asking how priorities of postcolonial
independence and development overlay bipolar or intra-communist
politics.135 Sharawy, Sira, 121–122. Cf. Ismael, 35 and Baulin, 47, who attribute more weight to
the Foreign Ministry.
136 See Sharawy, Sira, 136.
137 Sharawy, Sira, 146–148.
138 Sharawy, Interview.
139 Murad Ghalib,Ma‘ Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Sadat: Mudhakirat Murad Ghalib [With Abdel
Nasser and Sadat: Murad Ghalib’s Memoirs] (Cairo: Al-Ahram, 2001).
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movement of solidarity, not only in Cairo but outside also, in towns as
well as in villages . . . People from long distances, from the north and
the south, have come to wish us success. In Egypt, at least, it has
become a people’s movement. Who can resist the force of its
momentum now?140If Bandung was the moment of emergence for Egypt’s Afro-Asian
solidarity framework, then the Cairo Conference provided the
opportunity for its enunciation. The Egyptian activists and intellec-
tuals engaged in this project aimed at nothing less than a remaking of
the world order, in an endeavor that sought to connect between local
places across the colonised space, overturning imperial hierarchies.
They were driven by the example of Suez, and by the presence amongst
the Arab delegations of strong leftist voices, together with liberation
leaders who enjoyed bases in Cairo and coordinated policy with the
Egyptian delegation.141 The AAPSO then took its place alongside the
already vibrant African Association, and there followed several
AAPSO subcommittee conferences in Cairo: the Economics, Youth,
andWomen’s committees convened in December 1958, February 1959,
and January 1961 respectively.142 By the late 1950s then, Cairo had
been refashioned as an Afro-Asian hub, by facilitating interactions
amongst diverse national liberation activists at home, and enhancing
their mobility on multiple scales beyond.
In his review of recent historical geography scholarship on
solidarity, Diarmaid Kelliher argues for greater attention to the
structural contexts which condition solidarity practice over time: ‘a
generative conception of solidarity should not preclude attempting to
understand the basis on which such relationships have been developed,
and the wider contexts and structures that can both encourage and
restrict the possibilities of solidarity’.143 He presents decolonisation as a
broad historical framework which might be fruitfully investigated along
these lines. This article offers a contribution in this direction, having
presented a case study of solidarity practised in the historical context of140 Rameshwari Nehru, First Conference, 74.
141 Abdel Malek, 231.
142 Prashad, 57.
143 Kelliher, 8.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 189decolonisation, and negotiated with a centralised state engaged in an
anticolonial nation making project.
First, this article has explored the different kinds of Afro-Asian
identity being negotiated in Cairo in the 1950s, and the changing
contours of the Egyptian activists and intellectuals’ specific imagin-
aries. In pursuing a situated meaning of Afro-Asianism, the conditions
of possibility of solidarity pertinent to this case become clear, which in
turn sheds light on the processes that enable a particular Egyptian Afro-
Asianism to emerge. In this case, the mere notion of a common enemy
and a common experience of colonisation are departure points –
solidarity starts with entanglement144 – but cannot indicate the
contours that solidarity will follow: ‘Shared experiences matter in the
construction of solidarity, then, yet such relationships must be actively
produced, and can be developed in a multiplicity of ways’.145
Analysing the role of space in the building up of Cairo’s infra-
structure of solidarity is key here, since Egypt’s geography was partly a
source of vulnerability, but also one of great potential. Egypt was an
influential and independent Arab state, strategically located in Africa
and with powerful cultural influence in Asia through its ties to the
Levant and Gulf. Egypt’s counterparts in India or Ghana could not
mobilise the same range of identities and material resources, nor appeal
to the same range of communities. A spatial analysis shows the ways in
which Egyptians fostered translocal connections through the African
Association, the Cairo Conference, and later AAPSO, giving form and
substance to the notion of a shared Afro-Asian experience and hence
to a shared project. An important element that is often overlooked
today is the promotion by Egyptian activists and leaders alike of the
causes of Algeria and Palestine, making a lasting impact on anti-
imperialist agendas through anArabAfro-Asian imaginary. As Kelliher
writes, ‘nuanced historical geographies, attentive to the context of
political activism and the diverse forms solidarities can take, help open
up what can often be quite flattening abstract theorising around
solidarity’.146
This article has further analysed the interactions between the state
and popular networks of solidarity during decolonisation. In theorising
race and the origins of solidarity, Juliet Hooker underscores the
importance of structural conditions to mutual obligation: ‘solidarity144 Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
145 Kelliher, 5.
146 Kelliher, 5.
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kinds of structural relations in which such shared membership enme-
shes them’.147 Broadly speaking, the spaces that Afro-Asian activists
inhabited together were translocal, and the structures in which they
were enmeshed were colonially constituted, which significantly
complicated the task of communication and forging common meeting
spaces. Yet the provision of substantial state resources, together with
the labour of translocal organising undertaken by activists and
intellectuals, helped build up an infrastructure of solidarity in
Cairo that tempered this challenge significantly. 1950s Cairo proved
to be a productive place for solidarity practice, in which the Afro-
Asian project’s features could take shape. The line separating the state
apparatus from the intellectuals under study here was blurred: there
was a broad consensus around the state’s ideological framework of
anti-imperialism, national development, and Afro-Asian solidarity.
Accordingly, the great writers and artists of the day often supported
state projects – through the Association’s magazine for example, or
the Cairo Conference committees – even as they kept their distance
institutionally.
At the same time, the Egyptian case illustrates the limits placed
upon popular solidarity by a centralised state in the context of
decolonisation. In 1950s Egypt, channels for political expression and
influence in the public sphere were closely monitored by the state. The
input of intellectuals to state projects was subject to the intersecting
tensions of domestic power struggles, and to embroilment in the inter-
state rivalries of high politics. The Egyptian left was vulnerable to
domestic repression, for example,whichwas itself contingent on regional
balances of power and ideological competition with Arab communism.
DuringAAPSO’s early years, solidarity activists confronted the influence
of Sino-Soviet tensions, and instances of Egypt’s Arab and African
loyalties competing, as thepresenceof Israeldroveawedgebetweenmany
of itsnewconnections.Therewasalso a contradictionbetween theaim to
disseminate a new mass political culture, and the obligation to do this
by central means. State sponsorship could spell overmanagement, and
the imposition of a conservative political line, which reined in
such expansive, indeed revolutionary, visions as those of the Cairo
Conference’s leftist delegates. A case in point is the state’s tradition of
converting the liberationmovement offices in Zamalek into embassies as147 Juliet Hooker, Race and the Politics of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 38.
Abou-El-Fadl: Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub 191soonas independencewasachieved, underlining its principles ofnational
sovereignty and mutual non-interference.148
If the state attempted to direct popular activists, and assign them
particular positions, those activists also utilised those positions in
political contestation to make their own demands, for example placing
pressure on the state to deliver on its pledges, and introducing new
areas to state agendas on Afro-Asian cultural exchange. A detailed
grasp of the organisational landscape under Nasser shows that
intellectuals and activists of the left – in their withdrawal of support
just as in their collaborations – were critical to the production of the
Egyptian political order. The dynamics at play here are further
illuminated by a consideration of subsequent eras, and by paying
attention to ‘both the opening up and the closing down of such spaces
of solidarity’.149 In the 1970s, the reversal by Anwar Sadat of much of
Nasser’s foreign policy led to the defunding of Cairo’s infrastructures of
solidarity, and the shrivelling of opportunities for Afro-Asian
connections. The African Association was neglected, for example,
and no longer used politically. It also led to upheaval on a personal level
for those who had sustained them: Fayiq, for example, was jailed in
1971, and Sharawy was moved out of his position in 1973.150While the
state’s about-turn may seem to be the key here, it becomes clear that it
was not simply the state’s resources that had powered the Afro-Asian
hub. Sadat’s repression could not entirely overwhelm the popular
networks that had been built in Cairo: from 1973 to 1980, Sharawy
was able to transform the Association into a cultural and
intellectual centre renamed the African Society, engaged particularly
with the African Association of Political Science in Dar Es-Salam.
Sharawy and his colleagues took up oppositional activism, and
maintained personal and political links across Africa that fostered
the mobility of ideas and initiatives beyond and in contestation of
the newly hostile state.151
These insights underline the need to couch any study of Cold War
dynamics within a larger decolonial frame, and to situate Cold War
studies within the field of imperial history, given the salience of
colonial legacies and neo-colonial power relations in determining the
positions of members of the Afro-Asian bloc. The Egyptian case further
highlights the importance of collaborative work across regional and148 Sharawy, Interview.
149 Kelliher, 4.
150 See Sharawy, Sira, 247–249.
151 Sharawy, Sira, 249–406.
192 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019linguistic specialisms, through ‘multiple archives, languages, and
perspectives’.152 This helps bring area studies conventions into
question, and allows a more precise – if painstaking – construction
of a larger scale view. Thus the Egyptian story offers global history and
non-Middle East area studies scholarship a local context to the Cairo
Conference and AAPSO, and some texture to an otherwise mono-
chromatic image of its leadership. Conversely the non-Middle East
scholarship offers the study of Egypt an awareness of comparable and
connected cases in the Afro-Asian space, and of local contexts that
shaped the decisions of Egypt’s interlocutors. This reveals the multiple
ways in which Egypt thereby contributed to trajectories of
decolonisation beyond its borders, and to what is now recognised as
the multipolarity of the Cold War.153
Finally, directing attention to the process of construction and
projection of Egyptian Afro-Asianism, and to its contingency and
fragility, counterbalances much of the conventional framing of Egypt
within a dichotomy of success and failure. This binary has too often
engulfed the Afro-Asian project also, deeming it to have been more
‘spirit’ than substance. Instead, examining the opportunities that
solidarity gave to smaller powers, and smaller movements, helps compel
a historical engagement with a world of very different imagined
possibilities, and as sound a grasp of those that were realised as those that
faded. Ultimately, collective efforts to forge a new Afro-Asian centre of
gravity in an unequal world system took place at every level, and deserve
to form a greater part of the scholarly stories of decolonisation.152 Afro-Asian Networks Collective, ‘Manifesto: Networks of Decolonization in Asia
and Africa’, Radical History Review 131 (2018): 179.
153 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of
Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
